The Potential of a Power‑Sharing Government to Prevent Post‑election Violence in Uganda: Perspectives from Mid-Western Region

Abstract

Studies have revealed that a number of countries in the East African region have faced challenges in preventing post-election violence. Therefore, this article examined the potential of a Power-Sharing Government (PSG) to preventing post-election violence in Uganda. PSG is emerging as an issue, seeing that the country has endured post-election violence since the 2006 elections. A qualitative approach was used for data collection from key informants that were selected from four districts in mid-western Uganda; personal interviews were conducted with 16 senior politicians, eight members of civil society and four elders. The findings suggest that adopting the PSG approach facilitates a coalition to have authority to bargain in the interest of the country; a joint veto can lessen majority influence by allowing minority groups to prevent a change in policy; proportional representation can surpass the electoral system in a divided country; and equitable distribution of key positions in the national military can lead to sanity in the country’s defence sector. Consequently, the article concludes that PSG can succeed in mitigating potential post-election violence even if every ideal factor put forth by a con-sociational approach is not adopted in totality. It is recommended that political leaders and other stakeholders should seek possible means to achieving a comprehensive PSG